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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Marshall Shapo’s prodigious body of work, spanning several 
distinct fields, provides no shortage of praiseworthy contributions. 
Ironically, though, it is this same enormity of output that makes it effectively 
impossible to do justice to it all. So, rather than be thorough or representative, 
I select only one small subset of his publications in my own field of science 
and the law to celebrate. 
Professor Shapo is the first—and still the only—academic to explain 
that by allowing untested chemical products onto the market we, as a society, 
enable companies to experiment on unwitting humans to test drugs, 
consumer products, workplaces, and environmental exposures. In a series of 
books beginning in 1979, Professor Shapo placed this phenomenon of human 
experimentation—what he sometimes calls “mass market 
experimentation”1—not only within tort, but also within the scope of 
regulatory law.2 He mapped how legal institutions sometimes “compete” to 
protect against these types of nonconsensual experiments, how they often 
conflict,3 and how they sometimes fall short, leading to what he calls 
“laissez-faire with a vengeance.”4 He even drafted an “injury law 
constitution” that endeavors to extract the very best that this “jagged” body 
of law has to offer public health and safety,5 while also offering some 
normative principles to guide the law as it continues to develop over time. 
In this Essay, I spotlight both how prophetic and how critically 
important Professor Shapo’s four decades of writing on “humans as guinea 
pigs” have become.6 His work is prophetic because he sees a coherent 
problem that would have otherwise been ignored. His work is of enduring 
importance because, despite Professor Shapo’s painstaking research, the 
legal response to this experimentation has, if anything, become steadily 
worse. The need for integrated legal solutions is growing even more urgent, 
 
 1 See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO, EXPERIMENTING WITH THE CONSUMER: THE MASS TESTING OF 
RISKY PRODUCTS ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 6, 211–14 (2009) (exposing the widespread practice of 
mass-market experimentation, where consumers are exposed to product risks that have been insufficiently 
tested, often in deliberate ways, by manufacturers). 
 2 Id.; see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 5, 7 (1979) [hereinafter SHAPO, A 
NATION OF GUINEA PIGS] (documenting the harmful effects of a number of prominent products, like DES, 
and critiquing the legal system’s inadequate response to anticipating and preventing these harms); 
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, at xi (2016) [hereinafter SHAPO, THE 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY] (tracing society’s varied responses to experimenting on humans which occurs 
through exposure of persons to untested risks of new technologies without their permission). 
 3 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 92–93, 264 (2012); SHAPO, THE 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 314. 
 4 SHAPO, supra note 3, at 169. 
 5 Id. at 193. 
 6 See supra note 2. 
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and his contributions on this subject will play a central role in locating 
solutions. 
In the first two parts of this Essay, I survey several foundational pieces 
of Professor Shapo’s framing of the human experimentation problem. This 
includes both the legal, normative principles that should guide technological 
innovation, discussed in Part I, as well as practical evidence that these 
principles are being violated, particularly in the production and use of 
chemical-based products, explained in Part II. The third Part then explores 
how the law seems to be absent from overseeing this human experimentation, 
particularly for chemical-based products. Instead of deterring nonconsensual 
human experimentation, existing laws actually reinforce these practices, 
creating legally tolerated sanctuaries of human experimentation. The final 
Part of this Essay applies Professor Shapo’s legal methods of inter-
institutional analysis to locate better legal approaches to counteract 
unreasonable human experimentation. 
I. IDENTIFYING THE UNDERLYING NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
GOVERNING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
In An Injury Law Constitution, Professor Shapo employs his mastery of 
product liability law to inductively locate constitution-like principles that 
generally represent the thrust of the common law’s normative goals for 
public health and welfare.7 There are two principles from Professor Shapo’s 
An Injury Law Constitution that are particularly instructive to understanding 
the phenomenon of human experimentation. The first is the critical role of 
law in encouraging socially beneficial innovation.8 The second is the need 
for those engaged in risky activities (and innovations) to take responsibility 
for anticipating and preventing unreasonable harm in settings where they are 
better suited to assess long-term safety.9 
When these two principles are combined, their “balancing” leads to a 
relatively clear goal: that in the innovation and manufacture of complex 
products, manufacturers should share some responsibility for the safety of 
those products.10 Beneficial innovation, in other words, involves a reasonable 
anticipation and prevention of unnecessary health and environmental harms 
from new technologies. By factoring safety considerations into firms’ 
research and development (R&D) activities, the law thus helps guide 
innovation in a positive, public-benefitting direction.11 
 
 7 SHAPO, supra note 3, at 268–72. 
 8 Id. at 169; SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at 254. 
 9 SHAPO, supra note 3, at 215, 269. 
 10 See, e.g., id. at 197. 
 11 See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at xv, 53, 259. 
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This “injury constitution” also underscores the importance of living in 
a world with these kinds of legal directives in place. If consumers were 
responsible for testing and ensuring product safety in complex markets, then 
not only would the consumers regularly encounter risks they cannot 
reasonably understand or avoid, but manufacturers would be allowed to 
innovate in ways that are largely blind to public safety.12 Rather than 
conducting reasonable anticipatory research on safety, humans would 
unwittingly become the experimental subjects.13 
Instead, we expect the law to channel manufacturers towards socially 
beneficial innovation. This could be done—among other ways—by placing 
the burden on manufacturers to engage in reasonable research and 
development of safer products and sanctioning them with tort liability and 
regulatory penalties when they miss the opportunity to do so.14 Once the law 
points innovative behavior in the right direction, it will also be easier for 
consumers to evaluate competitor products and services with respect to 
safety. 
II. PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION WITHOUT 
CONSENT 
Despite enshrining these principles in an “injury constitution,” 
Professor Shapo recognizes, and meticulously traces out, the vast, real-world 
slippage occurring in practice, particularly with respect to chemical-based 
products and activities that cause long-term harms.15 In a series of books 
spanning more than three decades, Professor Shapo documents rampant 
experimentation on humans—without their consent—that appears to be both 
unreasonable and preventable through responsible premarket testing and 
analysis.16 A small sampling of this much larger body of work includes the 
following illustrations. 
Chemical Manufacture. The area of chemical manufacture has long 
been plagued by what seems to be rather stark evidence of underinvestment 
 
 12 See SHAPO, supra note 3, at 269–72. 
 13 Id. at 268–70. 
 14 See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 8, 129. 
 15 Other areas of this problematic experimentation that Professor Shapo documents, not spotlighted 
in the text, include innovation on HIV/AIDs drugs, breast implants, Viagra, Estrogens, vaping, PFAS 
chemicals, the birth control pill, the use of food and color additives, DES, asbestos, and gene technologies. 
See generally SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2 (tracing harms caused by human 
experimentation in the marketing of the birth control pill, nitrites, DES, asbestos, and recombinant DNA); 
SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2 (examining human experimentation using a wide 
range of products and activities that include prescription drugs, BPA, and hydrofracking). 
 16 See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 1, at 6–7 (cataloging different types of experimentation). 
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in R&D on long-term safety.17 In the U.S., more than 40,000 chemicals are 
sold that serve as ingredients for numerous consumer, industrial, and medical 
products.18 Yet the toxicological understanding of this large universe of 
chemicals and products is quite limited. According to a series of reports, 
nearly two-thirds of all chemicals in commerce are insufficiently assessed 
based on existing toxicological standards, and the remaining 10,000-plus 
chemicals are supported by almost no safety data.19 Indeed, for thousands of 
chemicals, independent researchers cannot even learn the name, much less 
the chemical identity, of the chemical, due to overly generous trade secret 
claims.20 Untested and unanalyzed chemicals thus flood the market, and their 
potentially adverse effects on humans and the environment remain largely 
unstudied.21 
Nanotechnology. Despite the potential for health and environmental 
harms stemming from nanotechnology, in which products are comprised of 
man-made micro particles at the atomic scale, there is scant testing for their 
potential latent hazards either pre- or post-market.22 As one former 
government scientist summarized: “‘We have no information about chronic 
exposure, or whether or not those materials have a delay of 10 or 15 years,’ 
like asbestos.”23 To remedy the regulatory agencies’ own ignorance on these 
pivotal issues, the EPA requested that the industry voluntarily provide safety 
data, but little information was produced.24 Instead, it appears that industry 
 
 17 See, e.g., SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at xv–xvii. 
 18 See TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory: How to Access the TSCA Inventory, EPA (2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/how-access-tsca-inventory [https://perma.cc/D5S4-7FAT]. 
 19 See, e.g., STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY TOXIC CHEMS. FOR 
CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: 
STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 118 fig.2, 119 (1984); Richard Judson, Ann Richard, 
David J. Dix, Keith Houck, Matthew Martin, Robert Kavlock, Vicki Dellarco, Tala Henry, Todd 
Holderman, Philip Sayre, Shirlee Tan, Thomas Carpenter & Edwin Smith, The Toxicity Data Landscape 
for Environmental Chemicals, 117 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 685, 685 (2009). 
 20 Rob Coleman, Melanie Benesh & David Andrews, Off the Books II: More Secret Chemicals, EWG 
(May 9, 2016), https://www.ewg.org/research/off-the-books-ii-more-secret-chemicals [https://perma.cc/
6XGZ-G5A8]. 
 21 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-696T, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT AND EPA IMPLEMENTATION 13–14 (2013); 
U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ENV-166, SCREENING AND TESTING CHEMICALS 
IN COMMERCE 11 (1995). 
 22 See SHAPO, supra note 3, at 168–69; SHAPO, supra note 1, at 188–210; see also Health Risks of 
Nanotechnology: How Nanoparticles Can Cause Lung Damage, And How the Damage Can Be Blocked, 
SCIENCEDAILY (June 11, 2009), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090610192431.htm 
[https://perma.cc/N4KQ-F9EM]. 
 23 Sheila Kaplan, Nanotechnology: Harmful or Benign?, FLA. BULLDOG (July 24, 2013), 
https://www.floridabulldog.org/2013/07/nanotechnology-harmful-or-benign/ [https://perma.cc/TCR9-
DX2F]. 
 24 Id. 
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investments in nanotechnology innovation prioritize the marketable benefits 
of the technology rather than its safety. Moreover, since human exposures 
are diffuse and almost impossible to track, the primary data we are able to 
collect from human experimentation comes from highly exposed workers,25 
which is largely produced by academics and government researchers rather 
than by nanotech manufacturers.26 
Fracking. Fracking, a technique used to tap difficult-to-reach natural 
gas reserves, utilizes chemicals to facilitate the extraction processes. Existing 
research on the long-term risks and harms associated with fracking in general 
and fracking fluids in particular is slim and, again, is largely produced by 
government and academic scientists outside of industry.27 At most, the 
fracking industry has complied with the regulatory agencies’ requests to 
provide data on spills and similar events during fracking processes, with the 
government conducting the resulting health and safety research.28 
Additionally, at least some of the chemicals used for extraction are trade 
secret protected, making it difficult for third parties to evaluate the safety of 
the chemicals with respect to the short and long-term risks, including those 
risks associated with worker exposures and water contamination.29 As a 
result, if fracking imposes risks to human health, we will likely learn of these 
unwelcome effects from exposed populations after the fact. 
Latent Harms in Consumer Products Such as Dietary Supplements, 
Cosmetics, Fragrances, and Children’s Toys. There is similarly little 
evidence of significant industry investment in R&D of the long-term safety 
of consumer products that contain toxic substances with potential latent 
hazards.30 As just one example, widespread public concerns about the latent 
 
 25 See, e.g., Thomas A.J. Kuhlbusch, Susan W.P. Wijnhoven & Andrea Haase, Nanomaterial 
Exposures for Worker, Consumer and the General Public, 10 NANOIMPACT 11, 11 (2018). 
 26 See, e.g., Ira Bennett & Daniel Sarewitz, Too Little, Too Late? Research Policies on the Societal 
Implications of Nanotechnology in the United States, 15 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 309–10 (2006). 
 27 See generally SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 33–40 (discussing 
governmental and academic research conducted into fracking and the ways in which it conflicts with 
industry research and rhetoric to form an uncertain understanding of surrounding risks). 
 28 The EPA, for example, has published several reports on the effects of fracking on drinking water. 
See, e.g., EPA, EPA-600-R-16-236ES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2016). 
 29 Neela Banerjee, Fracking Companies Keep 10% of Chemicals Secret, EPA Says, INSIDE CLIMATE 
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/31032015/fracking-companies-keep-10-
chemicals-secret-epa-says [https://perma.cc/CG4D-TZ59]. 
 30 See SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 115–31 (documenting misleading 
representations and other unethical behavior by some product manufacturers regarding the risks of their 
products); see, e.g., NANCY UDING & ERIKA SCHREDER, CHEMICALS REVEALED: OVER 5000 KIDS’ 
PRODUCTS CONTAIN TOXIC CHEMICALS 1 (2013), http://toxicfreefuture.org/wp-
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risks of bisphenol A (BPA), an industrial chemical used to make plastics, led 
to considerable regulatory pressure (primarily from individual states) and 
market pressure on manufacturers who, in turn, found it necessary to invest 
in research and innovation on alternative plasticizers.31 Ironically, though, 
these alternative plasticizers are largely untested and may lead to adverse 
health effects as well.32 This same story can be retold for the substitute 
products used in place of other known hazards, such as the PFAS-laden, 
nonstick coatings used widely in cookware and a variety of other household 
products.33 
III. WHY IS THIS HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION OCCURRING? 
Combining Professor Shapo’s normative principles in An Injury Law 
Constitution with the disturbing evidence of mass market human 
experimentation leads naturally to the diagnostic question: How is this 
happening? 
Professor Shapo’s analytical methods—which insist on examining the 
legal system writ-large, rather than just one area, such as tort law, at a time—
point to at least one contributing explanation.34 The cumulative law, as 
currently applied to latent chemical hazards, not only tolerates human 
experimentation as the primary way to learn about chemical hazards, but may 
actually be tacitly encouraging this approach. Indeed, even after a chemical-
based product or activity is sold in commerce, there are no incentives—and 
potentially high costs in terms of financial liability and regulatory 
consequences—for the creators of the technologies to collect post-market 
data to learn about hazards or ways to improve the product. The law, in 
 
content/uploads/2016/09/Chemicals_Revealed_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQE8-RTHM]; Maureen 
Rice, Revealed . . . The 515 Chemicals Women Put on Their Bodies Every Day, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 20, 
2009, 9:59 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/beauty/article-1229275/Revealed--515-chemicals-
women-bodies-day.html [https://perma.cc/55CT-DQZT]. 
 31 See Mark J. Andreini, Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. & Paul M. Pohl, BPA, Phthalates, and the Law, 
JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Mar. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/bpa_phthalates/ [https://perma.cc/4QW6-
2E38]. 
 32 LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD., PHTHALATES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES: HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 8 (2011), http://www.sustainableproduction.org/downloads/Phthalate
Alternatives-January2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYN3-AZGV]. 
 33 See, e.g., Linda S. Birnbaum & Philippe Grandjean, Alternatives to PFASs: Perspectives on the 
Science, 123 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. A104, A104 (May 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4421778/ [https://perma.cc/K7EU-3KZT]; Laura Castañón, What You Need to Know 
About the ‘Forever Chemicals’ in Your Food, Water, and Air, NEWS@NE. (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://news.northeastern.edu/2019/10/23/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-pfas-the-forever-chemic
als-in-your-food-water-and-air/ [https://perma.cc/RP2V-ZVVV]. 
 34 See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at xiii; SHAPO, supra note 3, at 92–93; 
SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at xiv, xvi–xvii, 288; Marshall S. Shapo, Changing 
Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70’s, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 338–40 (1970). 
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effect, creates a legal “sanctuary” for unconstrained human 
experimentation.35 
Before examining how the law may create these aggregate incentives, 
the next Section provides a quick refresher as to why manufacturer-
innovators are generally best situated to factor long-term safety 
considerations into their R&D but might not be inclined to do so without 
external legal pressure. 
A. Is the Law Even Needed to Discourage Human Experimentation? 
There are several practical reasons, beyond the normative principle that 
Professor Shapo identifies, why it makes sense to place responsibility on 
manufacturer-innovators to invest in reasonable research on the long-term 
safety of their chemical-based products. First, and perhaps most important, 
since manufacturer-innovators are engaged in the development of products, 
incorporating safety considerations into the early stages of R&D is most 
efficient. Certainly product development and marketing expenses can be 
saved by creating safer products at this stage, before the product is prepared 
for the market. Manufacturers are also uniquely suited to do this testing 
because they can pass the costs of testing along to the final cost of their 
products. And as the creators of new products, manufacturers also enjoy 
superior access to understanding the potential risks and most useful types of 
toxicological research. Finally, even post-market, manufacturers serve as the 
central clearinghouse for consumer complaints, worker exposures, and other 
chemical-related information and are thus best able to analyze and act on 
emergent information on chemical hazards. 
Yet, without legal intervention, market pressures and associated 
reputational considerations are unlikely to adequately compensate 
manufacturers for conducting research on the latent harms of their chemical 
products.36 Conducting in-house research to identify long-term health 
hazards can be costly, and, even after the investment, the research may still 
be inconclusive.37 This research can also take time, which further delays 
marketing and profits. And chemical manufacturer–innovators have few to 
no market benefits to offset these costs; even if the manufacturer does 
rigorous five-star safety assessments as part of its R&D, consumers will 
likely discount this extra effort as “green-washing” because consumers have 
 
 35 See generally SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2 (documenting this 
unconstrained human experimentation by manufacturers and other industrial risk-creators in a number of 
illustrative areas of market activity). 
 36 See WENDY WAGNER, INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 135–36 (2019). 
 37 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 784–85, 788–89 (1997). 
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no way to validate the quality and rigor of the manufacturer’s assessments.38 
Finally, market intermediaries, like lenders and insurers, also face high costs 
in validating manufacturers’ self-assessments and comparing this 
information against competitor products.39 Without market rewards for these 
assessments, the least expensive (and perhaps the most risky) products will 
fare the best, leading to a classic market for lemons.40 
B. The Legal Sanctuary for Human Experimentation 
Based on these general market features with respect to latent hazards, it 
seems clear that the law is needed to counteract the rational incentives of 
manufacturer–innovators to neglect, or even ignore, long-term safety 
considerations in the course of technological innovation.41 
So how is the law abdicating its role and failing to place primary 
responsibility on manufacturers for considering safety in chemical 
innovation? Tort and regulatory law are considered in turn. 
1. Tort Law 
At first glance, we would expect tort law to create strong incentives for 
manufacturers to ensure the reasonable safety of their products. Tort doctrine 
imposes liability for negligent activities, which would seem to encompass 
deliberate, nonconsensual experimentation on humans. In fact, scores of 
successful plaintiffs have demonstrated the strength of tort law in product 
cases, holding manufacturers liable for a range of dangerous chemical 
products that involve acute hazards.42 Liability has also been periodically 
imposed on manufacturers for some long-term chemical-based harms. For 
example, consider the bankrupting effects of tort liability on asbestos 
manufacturers and the costly waves of litigation against the manufacturers 
of DES, lead paint, tobacco, and others.43 
 
 38 Leyla Acaroglu, What is Greenwashing? How to Spot It and Stop It, MEDIUM (July 8, 2019), 
https://medium.com/disruptive-design/what-is-greenwashing-how-to-spot-it-and-stop-it-c44f3d130d5 
[https://perma.cc/XJ4B-LWB8]; Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: 
Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1814 (1989) (“Buyers’ inability to 
screen products removes any incentive for manufacturers to differentiate between toxic and nontoxic 
products and to screen before production . . . . [and so] as long as the information market remains 
undeveloped, ignorance of toxicity may be an advantage to a product.”). 
 39 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 137–38. 
 40 See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1814 n.72. 
 41 See, e.g., SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at 244. There is a general sense, in 
other words, that for these long-term risks, “uncertainties should be resolved against the creators of 
potential danger” and at a minimum, “those who experiment on consumers . . . must let the consumers 
know that they are experimental animals.” Id. at 250, 251. 
 42 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Exposure, and 
Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 470–82 (2004). 
 43 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 37, at 821–25. 
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Yet, as several scholars have noted, to file a case, the victim–plaintiff 
must also produce some scientific evidence that the product actually caused 
his or her harm. It is therefore the plaintiff who bears the burden of 
introducing sufficient expert evidence to prove that the defendant’s product 
or action was more probably than not a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.44 
This basic pleading requirement creates a catch-22 in latent injury 
litigation. To press forward, the plaintiff must present credible evidence that 
the product was capable of doing the long-term harm they are alleging. But 
that burden undermines the safety incentives on manufacturers; the less 
testing conducted by the manufacturer-defendant, the more likely that 
defendant will be spared liability, at least without an independent body of 
incriminating third-party research. 
Indeed, over the last few decades, rather than becoming more forgiving 
with regard to this problematic burden of causation, some courts have 
become increasingly demanding in requiring rigorous scientific evidence 
supporting plaintiffs’ allegations before proceeding to trial.45 An evidentiary 
screening step—a Daubert hearing—presents perhaps the most significant 
impediment to latent harm cases.46 Under Daubert, defendants can file 
motions in limine, which seek to exclude some or all of plaintiffs’ expert 
testimony on causation, arguing that it is not scientifically reliable. These 
motions are especially successful in cases where there is no conclusive 
epidemiological research and plaintiff experts must inductively synthesize 
different bodies of evidence (e.g., case studies, pharmacological evidence, 
and animal studies) to support a potential causal link.47 Indeed, in a few 
jurisdictions, some district courts have attempted to go even further and 
actually insist on human evidence as a necessary predicate to a showing of 
causation in tort.48 
Mass litigation in asbestos, lead paint, DES, Dalkon Shield, Agent 
Orange, and C8 (used in Teflon), to name a few, uniformly showcases how 
the evidence needed to support private tort cases typically comes from 
experimentation on unconsenting humans.49 In Professor Shapo’s terms, this 
 
 44 See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 
43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 331 (1992); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 45 See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597–98. 
 46 See SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, 209–15; Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, 
Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 314–16 (2007). 
 47 See, e.g., Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ evidence as speculative where it extrapolated from studies of similar drugs and animal studies). 
 48 See, e.g., Arthur H. Bryant & Alexander Reinert, Epidemiology in the Legal Arena and the Search 
for Truth, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY S27, S29 (2001). 
 49 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 37, at 818–19. See generally ROBERT BILOTT, EXPOSURE (2019) 
(discussing the human evidence underlying our understanding of C8). 
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means that the courts are sometimes requiring nonconsensual human 
experimentation as a condition to tort liability. 
The benefits of ignorance regarding latent hazards are even more 
evident in cases where the plaintiffs’ claim survives dismissal and the 
plaintiffs can access the industry’s internal files during discovery. During 
this discovery, plaintiffs often learn of what Professor Shapo calls “red flag” 
evidence, which reveals that a manufacturer–defendant was alerted to 
potential long-term risks but chose to ignore these red flags while 
simultaneously suppressing them from public view.50 This internal evidence 
often plays a central role in explaining plaintiff verdicts, especially in cases 
with weak causation evidence, because it underscores the defendant’s 
unreasonable behavior.51 
On the other hand, from the manufacturers’ point of view, these red 
flags also inculcate the wisdom of an “ignorance is bliss” approach to testing 
and tracking latent product hazards. From these cases, manufacturers learn 
that resisting any testing and innovation insulates them from tort liability, 
but partial testing and presumably well-intended efforts to identify safer 
substitutes can trigger a barrage of legal vulnerabilities that can ultimately 
lead to bankrupting litigation. Professor Sanders observes that in these 
settings, the ability of firms to conduct research after litigation becomes a 
“lose-lose proposition” because “[i]f they showed an effect, the studies 
would be used against the company,” and if they did not, “[a]ny slight 
technical flaw in the design or execution of the experiment would be 
exploited by plaintiffs to undermine [the defendant’s] findings.”52 
By contrast, a manufacturer that knows nothing and learns nothing 
about its product faces lower risks of liability. Of course, this makes human 
experimentation still more problematic since it means that not only are 
unwitting humans exposed to under-tested hazards, but their injuries are not 
even monitored to allow society to learn about the human hazards caused by 
new technologies. 
2. Regulatory Law 
But, as Professor Shapo reminds us, there is a larger institutional setting 
within which tort law operates.53 One might assume that the reams of laws 
 
 50 SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 69, 127–29. 
 51 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 263, 289 (1996); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The 
Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53–56 (1993); Fredric L. Ellis & 
Ernest Hornsby, Letter to the Editor, Dow Chemical Hid Truth on Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1995, at A24. 
 52 Sanders, supra note 44, at 337. 
 53 See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 34, at 340. 
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and regulations governing chemical-based hazards fill in these legal gaps and 
encourage manufacturers to conduct rigorous premarket testing and institute 
rigorous post-market tracking and analyses. Accordingly, tort law would 
serve primarily a prophylactic role, providing compensation in cases where 
there is fraud or other particularly egregious conduct by the manufacturers. 
Unfortunately, despite more than one hundred pages of statutory text 
that seems to suggest otherwise,54 chemical regulatory oversight in the 
United States barely engages in the regulation of chemicals or chemical-
based consumer products (except drugs and, to some extent, pesticides).55 
Under these regulatory programs, there are few to no requirements on 
manufacturers for pre- and post-market testing and data analysis. And this 
limited government oversight remains fully in place despite a widely 
acclaimed legislative overhaul of the chemical regulatory program in 2016.56 
Specifically, as a matter of U.S. law, manufacturers of chemicals bear 
no burden for affirmatively analyzing or testing the safety of their chemicals, 
except when they are given explicit testing orders by the EPA (a process 
which manufacturers can oppose in court).57 Manufacturers are required by 
law to submit case reports of adverse effects they are aware of that occur 
post-market (e.g., red flag evidence).58 However, even with these mandated 
notifications, manufacturers are not required to evaluate the adverse effects 
or even submit the information to the regulators in a way that makes it easy 
for regulators to analyze.59 
Thus, rather than place responsibility for anticipatorily testing or 
assessing the long-term safety of chemicals on manufacturers, the 
responsibility is left to regulators.60 Without data to analyze, regulators 
essentially must guesstimate which of the 40,000 largely untested and 
 
 54 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012) (chemical substances); 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2012); Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 
15 U.S.C. § 2082 (2012) (consumer products). 
 55 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 138–39. 
 56 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448  
(2016). 
 57 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.45(a), 720.50(a)–(b) (2019) (listing the information required for new 
chemicals, which includes only “known” information about hazards); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 
859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (2012). 
 59 In response to this requirement, manufacturers in fact sometimes send all raw data—even data 
having no bearing on hazards—to understaffed regulators. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal 
Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to 
Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 146 (2004). 
 60 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 130–49. 
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unanalyzed chemicals sold in commerce are likely to be dangerous.61 And it 
is up to regulators to assemble risk assessments for each worrisome chemical 
selected out of the larger list. This means that for each suspect chemical, 
regulators—rather than the chemical manufacturers—must evaluate the 
scientific literature, order manufacturers to do specific toxicity tests on a 
case-by-case basis, and conduct regulatory evaluations to assess whether the 
combined exposure and toxicity of a worrisome chemical presents an 
unreasonable risk.62 The manufacturers’ primary role, by contrast, is limited 
to submitting comments critiquing the regulators’ efforts and ultimately 
challenging a regulatory assessment in court if a manufacturer finds an 
assessment or restriction to be unsatisfactory.63 
Moreover, even in the rare case that an individual chemical is ultimately 
identified as potentially hazardous and restricted in some way,64 
manufacturers may simply substitute other untested chemicals in its place.65 
The cycle then begins anew. It is once again up to the regulators to learn 
about whether these new chemical substitutes are hazardous and, if the 
information is lacking, to order additional testing. No wonder we see 
worrisome substitutions occurring for hazardous chemicals like BPA and 
PFAS in the chemical market.66 
With the aggregate burden on regulators for assessing latent chemical 
hazards, the incentives for factoring long-term safety considerations into 
manufacturing practices are set in reverse.67 Much like the incentives created 
by tort law, rational manufacturers will find that the most expedient and least 
expensive way to navigate the regulatory requirements is to forgo safety 
testing, internal risk assessments, and active post-marketing tracking of long-
term risks. Internal due diligence by manufacturers again creates a lose-lose 
proposition that triggers greater, rather than less, regulatory oversight and 
 
 61 See TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory: How to Access the TSCA Inventory, supra note 18. For 
an accessible summary of EPA’s regulatory requirements, see Highlights of Key Provisions in the Frank 
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-
managing-chemicals-under-tsca/highlights-key-provisions-frank-r-lautenberg-chemical [https://per
ma.cc/JZG7-QFBM]. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 143–46, 149. 
 64 Only five chemicals have been banned since 1976. Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: 
Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1830 (2009). 
 65 See, e.g., Steve C. Gold & Wendy E. Wagner, Filling Gaps in Science Exposes Gaps in Chemical 
Regulation, 368 SCI. 1066, 1067–68 (2020); Philippe Grandjean, Delayed Discovery, Dissemination, and 
Decisions on Intervention in Environmental Health: A Case Study on Immunotoxicity of Perfluorinated 
Alkylate Substances, 17 ENV’T HEALTH 62, 62 (2018). 
 66 See, e.g., Birnbaum & Grandjean, supra note 33, at A104. 
 67 This is particularly true for existing chemicals. Under the 2016 Lautenberg Amendments, the EPA 
was granted broader authority to require testing on untested chemicals. Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 
448 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(2) (2018)). 
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restrictions. Unstructured experimentation on humans (and the environment) 
becomes the primary way for society to learn about chemical hazards.68 
In sum, existing law creates a protected sanctuary that allows and even 
encourages human experimentation in lieu of responsible testing and 
analysis of unreasonable chemical hazards. Humans not only serve as the 
unwitting guinea pigs, but their sacrifices are also generally not dignified 
with systematic data collection in an effort to identify possible hazards post-
market. Moreover, the growing number of synergistic and cumulative 
reactions from multiple unanalyzed chemical products makes the ability to 
learn from human experimentation still less likely.69 Ironically, the greater 
the number of untested hazards that human guinea pigs are exposed to, the 
more difficult it will be for scientists to learn about individual product risks 
post-market. 
IV. NEXT STEPS 
As Professor Shapo observes, “the power of experimenters to control 
risk, and . . . the ignorance and helplessness of victims[]replicate themselves 
in many environments” and warrant more coherent legal intervention.70 So 
what to do? 
At a general level, “[t]he experimental society needs mechanisms that 
enable government to get out in front of problems identified with all kinds 
of experimentation.”71 Responsibility must be placed on manufacturers to 
incorporate safety considerations into their innovative processes for 
chemical-based products. And, if manufacturers fail to do this, the legal 
consequences must be far greater than the benefits manufacturers enjoy by 
proceeding in ignorance. 
Both regulatory and tort adjustments are needed, but an overhaul of 
chemical regulation is of highest priority, since proactive regulation has the 
potential to be the most direct, enforceable, and comprehensive solution. 
Consistent with Professor Shapo’s normative principles, the nature of this 
general reform would be straightforward: before keeping or releasing a 
chemical product on the market, the manufacturer must be required, at least, 
to rigorously assess the long-term risks based on the existing available 
information.72 Manufacturers should also be tasked with collecting and 
 
 68 SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 127–29. 
 69 See Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2332–37 (2017) 
(describing some of the particular challenges of assessing cumulative risk from “multiple exposure 
pathways”). 
 70 SHAPO, THE EXPERIMENTAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 357. 
 71 Id. at 40. 
 72 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 36, at 149–57. 
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assessing post-market data continuously in order to monitor unexpected 
hazards. These adjustments fully comport with Professor Shapo’s An Injury 
Law Constitution.73 While humans may continue to serve in some settings as 
the unwitting subjects of post-market experimentation, manufacturers will at 
least be required to limit this role to hazards that cannot be reasonably 
anticipated or prevented. 
To ensure the manufacturers’ safety assessments are reliable, technical 
rules are also needed to dictate the terms of scientifically acceptable risk 
analyses and testing.74 For example, the manufacturers should be required to 
use standardized protocols and computational models that have been 
designed by prominent expert panels. And manufacturers must be required 
to compare their products against the safest substitutes and explain the 
resulting findings in scientifically rigorous yet accessible ways. Regulatory 
requirements in both Europe and California have already moved in this 
general direction;75 although, to be effective, regulatory oversight must be 
still more demanding. 
Any reformed regulatory program, however, necessarily runs the risk 
of leaving gaps—for example, perhaps regulators will fail to implement or 
enforce these requirements or will overlook an unreasonably dangerous 
chemical for a variety of reasons. As we have learned from the last century, 
these inevitable cracks in regulatory oversight provide a central reason why 
it is important to keep state tort law in place, without any preemption.76 
Accordingly, expansions and adjustments to the common law, in theory, are 
also needed. 
Some courts have attempted to address the perverse incentive problem 
in tort law by adjusting the plaintiffs’ causation burden in a subset of cases 
where there is strong evidence that the defendant–manufacturers 
 
 73 See SHAPO, supra note 3, at 215, 269. 
 74 Cf. Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and 
Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 565, 636 (2014) (offering parallel types of 
recommendations for financial disclosure regulation that inspired the reforms for chemical regulation 
proposed here); see also SHAPO, supra note 3, at 215, 269 (discussing the economic incentives and legal 
analysis performed when analyzing level of risk). 
 75 See, e.g., Safer Consumer Products Regulations, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22 (2013) (summarized at 
Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control, What Are the Safer Consumer Products Regulations?, CA.GOV, 
https://dtsc.ca.gov/what-are-the-safer-consumer-products-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/3U5V-6QR7]); 
Commission Regulation (EC) 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1. 
 76 SHAPO, supra note 3, at 93–94. The 2016 TSCA amendments include intricate preemption 
provisions, but the savings clause included in those provisions seems likely to preserve most state tort 
claims. See, e.g., Liza Magley & Richard Weber, Toxic Tort and Environmental Litigation: What Does a 
Reformed TSCA Mean for Private Rights of Action Under State Law? (9/16), JD SUPRA (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/toxic-tort-and-environmental-litigation-79945/ [https://perma.cc/R9
D5-4EFZ]. 
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unreasonably exposed a plaintiff to untested but potentially significant 
exposures.77 However, thus far, these trial-and-error adjustments to the 
causation requirement still yield a risk of too many false positives in favor 
of plaintiffs, with a credible risk of unwarranted, opportunistic litigation.78 
As a result, adjustments to the remedies (and associated claims) 
available in tort law are better suited to offer promising reforms to this 
challenge. For example, Professor Alexandra Lahav isolates a “knowledge 
remedy” that has been made available in several cases and could become 
more routine in the future.79 Rather than providing victims with 
compensation for harm or even medical monitoring, a knowledge remedy 
provides unconsenting victims of chemical risks with injunctive-type relief 
that requires the manufacturer to conduct reasonable research on the hazards. 
This court-mandated testing can then seed more lucrative injury claims down 
the road. This ingenious proposal would likely still be limited to hazards that 
appear to cause human harms, but the additional deterrent could add more 
counterweight to the existing legal incentives that favor human 
experimentation. 
Along these same lines, public nuisance claims—filed by government 
entities that aggregate the human hazards in their jurisdiction traced to a 
particular unreasonable hazard—are capable of side-stepping some of the 
causal difficulties faced in individualized suits. For example, the City of San 
Francisco succeeded in obtaining compensation from two paint companies 
for the remediation of hazardous (but undisclosed) lead paint in buildings 
throughout the city dating back to the mid-1900s.80 In a similar vein, the 
Attorney General of Oklahoma succeeded against Johnson & Johnson at the 
trial level in a public nuisance claim seeking compensation for the state’s 
public health expenses resulting from opioid addictions traced to careless 
marketing practices by the company.81 
 
 77 See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To say that [the 
defendant’s drug] caused [the plaintiff’s] injuries is only half the story, however. In order for the causation 
requirement to be met, a trier of fact must be able to determine . . . that the defendant’s negligence was 
responsible for the injury.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Williams v. Utica Coll. Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 120–22 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(significantly narrowing the causation test propounded in Zuchowicz). 
 79 Alexandra D. Lahav, The Knowledge Remedy, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1366–75 (2020). 
 80 See Joshua Schneyer, California Settles Decades-Long Lawsuit Over Lead Paint, but Outcome Is 
Bittersweet, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lead-
california/california-settles-decades-long-lawsuit-over-lead-paint-but-outcome-is-bittersweet-idUSKCN
1UC2H5 [https://perma.cc/2RX6-ZK7K]. 
 81 See John Culhane, The Little Known Legal Doctrine Making Big Pharma Pay for the Opioid Crisis, 
POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/28/johnson-and-johnson-
decision-opioids-227913 [https://perma.cc/9MHU-44UW]. 
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Ultimately, the most effective reforms will entail a combination of both 
tort and regulatory law, consistent with the “New Torts” identified by 
Professor Shapo back in 1970.82 A temporary amnesty for manufacturers 
from all legal sanctions may be needed for several years while they 
incorporate long-term safety considerations into their products and practices. 
Other adjustments may be necessary as well to shift the equilibrium in favor 
of manufacturer responsibility for unreasonable chemical hazards. However 
the reforms are crafted, some relatively radical changes to existing law seem 
necessary in the short-term. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Shapo’s work illuminates a complicated thicket of liability 
and regulatory rules that create perverse incentives for human 
experimentation in the manufacture of chemical-based products. Only by 
mapping out these overlapping legal programs and tracing how they affect 
the incentives of manufacturers can we see how current laws perversely 
tolerate and even encourage human experimentation in areas of chemical-
based products. While there is still a long way to go in collapsing this 
sanctuary for human experimentation, Professor Shapo has forged a path 
through the legal forest. All we need to do is follow it to the end. 
 
 
 82 SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS, supra note 2, at 338. 
